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rbitration and the Constitution? At first glance, these two
topics would appear to be strange bedfellows.
The Constitution largely concerns the distribution of power
among branches of the federal government, the relationship
between federal and state governments, and the government’s
relationship with the individual. With little exception, it does
not address purely private conduct.
Arbitration, by comparison, is
traditionally understood to be a
largely private undertaking.
In a run-of-the-mine case, parties
include arbitration clauses in their
contracts and thereby express a
contractual preference to resolve
their disputes out of court. Instead
of a judge or jury, a private citizen
(or panel of them), often chosen by
the parties, resolves that dispute.
Unlike judges, arbitrators are
not bound to apply a particular
set of procedural rules (unless the
parties so request) and consequently enjoy a comparatively greater
degree of procedural flexibility in how they resolve a dispute. The
arbitrator’s decision then is final and binding on the parties.
So what do these two systems – one largely concerned with
state relations and one largely removed from state activity – have
to do with each other?
For a long time, the answer was “not much.” A firm wall
separated constitutional law from arbitration law.
For the first 150 years of the republic, various doctrines
supported this separation.

During the late 1920s, cracks in
the wall separating arbitration and
the Constitution began to appear.
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Of central importance was the doctrine of jurisdictional ouster.
Under this doctrine, predispute arbitration agreements were not
enforceable because they attempted to “oust” courts of jurisdiction
(similar doctrines operated to invalidate choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses during this period). As a matter of contract
law, such agreements were void as contrary to public policy.
Things changed during the 1920s when Congress enacted
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Modeled on New York’s
arbitration law, the FAA made two critical changes in federal law.
First, it overcame the century-old judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements. Instead, such agreements were now
enforceable “save upon such grounds as existed at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”
Second, the FAA required courts to confirm arbitral awards
(that is, convert them to judgments) subject to a limited number
of defenses. Those defenses were largely limited to procedural
defects (like biased arbitrators) and did not concern legal errors in
the award (as might be the basis for an appellate court’s reversal of
a district court’s decision).
While the FAA expanded the opportunities for arbitration,
particularly in the commercial setting, significant constraints
remained in the decades following its passage.
Among them was the non-arbitrability doctrine. Under this
doctrine, courts would not enforce arbitration agreements to the
extent the underlying dispute involved a federal statutory claim
(such as under the securities laws or the antitrust laws).
The theory here was one of statutory interpretation – it would
be inconsistent with the congressional grant of jurisdiction and
would create a cause of action under these statutes to allow parties
to sweep them out of court and into a private tribunal.
While the decisions were not couched in explicitly
constitutional terms, they reflected a set of constitutionally based
concerns about the importance of federal courts and the process
by which “public” disputes would be resolved.
Beginning in the 1970s, three key changes significantly
enhanced pressures on the wall separating arbitration and the
Constitution.
First, the United States ratified the New York Convention.
That treaty, heralded as one of the greatest achievements in private
international law during the 20th century, obligated signatories to
give effect to arbitration agreements and arbitration awards.
Second, the United States began to enter into a series of
bilateral investment treaties and trade treaties that included
arbitration as the favored dispute resolution mechanism.
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Third, the U.S. Supreme Court systematically dismantled the
non-arbitrability doctrine.
By the early 1990s, most disputes, including those arising
under federal laws like the antitrust and securities laws, were
now arbitrable, whether they arose in the international or purely
domestic context.
Consequently, today, a variety of disputes – ranging from
garden-variety disputes between credit card holders and their
banks to disputes between Canadian softwood lumber producers
and the U.S. Government – are subject to the same basic form
of resolution: private arbitration, outside the courts under a
procedurally flexible regime where the result is binding on the
parties.
This brings us back to the relationship between arbitration
and the Constitution. As arbitration has become a preferred
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form for the resolution of disputes, large and small, fissures have
emerged in that wall separating these two fields.
In a forthcoming book, I analyze those fissures systematically,
but here let me identify four:

Separation of Powers

Recall that one feature of arbitration is
that the result is binding on the parties and that, as a consequence
of the FAA, courts are largely obligated to confirm arbitral awards,
thereby giving them the effect of a court-rendered judgment.
In international trade and investment treaties, the
opportunities for judicial review are even more limited.
How are such schemes consistent with Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, which vests judicial power in the U.S. Supreme
Court and lower federal courts?
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“[A]rbitration raises a host
of interesting constitutional
questions, many of which are at
the forefront of ongoing debates
in the courts and in Congress.”
When the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., it articulated a firm stance that Congress could not simply
reallocate power to resolve private rights from the Article III
courts to other entities that did not have the life tenure and
independence associated with federal judges.
Doesn’t arbitration do precisely that?

Due Process

Recall that another hallmark of arbitration is the
procedural flexibility afforded to the arbitrator.
How is this scheme consistent with the Due Process Clause?
In a variety of cases, the Supreme Court has made clear
that non-Article III entities cannot deprive individuals of
constitutionally protected interests (like property) without
procedural due process.
But if arbitrators are not bound to follow any particular set
of procedures, what guarantees does a party (particularly an
individual litigant) have that her claim will be accorded due
process?
Is it sufficient to say that arbitration simply does not constitute
state action and, thus, does not implicate the Constitution? If that
is the case, then, does judicial confirmation of the award supply
the state action?

Thus, arbitration raises a host of interesting constitutional
questions, many of which are at the forefront of ongoing debates
in the courts and in Congress.
While the questions are interesting in their own right, even
more interesting is how they have been addressed.
Largely, the courts have resisted efforts to develop a formal
“constitutional law of arbitration.”
Instead, constitutional principles have seeped into the arbitral
jurisprudence in more subtle ways. For example, courts have
interpreted provisions of the previously referenced New York
Convention to incorporate standards of procedural due process.
Similarly, faced with an assault on arbitration following the
demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine, arbitral institutions like
the American Arbitration Association have committed themselves
to administering some arbitrations according to “due process”
protocols that employ constitutional-like concepts but do not
expressly commit them to all of the accoutrements of procedural
due process doctrine.
Furthermore, drafters of international trade and investment
treaties have designed implementing legislation in order to
preserve safety valves for judicial review of certain questions in
order to steer clear of any Article III controversies.
In conclusion, the story of arbitration and the Constitution
is more than simply a story of how a once-disfavored form of
dispute resolution has crept slowly into our legal lives.
Instead, the history and developments teach us something
deeper about how areas of the law influence each other, not
simply on the basis of express doctrinal incorporation or
development but rather through more subtle influences that
filter into our legal dialogue through cracks in a wall that once
separated the two fields.

The Jury Right Remember that arbitration typically occurs in

front of a panel of one or more privately appointed arbitrators.
How is this scheme consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s
entitlement of a civil jury in most civil cases?
The typical explanation is that individuals by opting into
arbitration have waived their right to a jury.
But is this necessarily so? Why should the jury right be
alienable at all? And even if it should be, why should an
arbitration clause (particularly if it makes no mention of a jury
waiver) suffice to waive an important constitutional right?

Federalism

As noted earlier, the FAA required courts to
enforce arbitration agreements subject only to generally applicable
contract defenses.
Does federal or state law supply the relevant contract doctrine?
If federal law does so, how is this consistent with Erie v. Tompkins,
which declared an end to “general” federal common law?
If state law applies, does that not allow state governments to
thwart Congress’ scheme by developing anti-arbitration doctrines?
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